「コスト高です」で、責任まで値上げするな——セブン、ユニクロと企業の忘れられない履歴｜Higher Prices Do Not Erase Corporate Records
［初出日未確認・表示日は移行日］ Japan’s Cost-of-Living Story Needs a Corporate Memory “Costs have risen” may explain a price increase. It does not close a company’s accountability file. Nikkei’s Oc
Japan’s Cost-of-Living Story Needs a Corporate Memory
“Costs have risen” may explain a price increase. It does not close a company’s accountability file.
Nikkei’s October 30 report compares selected prices with late 2021: a Seven-Eleven salmon rice ball is up 52.1%, Uniqlo’s Kando trousers 25.1%, and the reported Tokyo single-person rental average 50.2%. These are Nikkei’s comparisons, not an independently reconstructed price database. The trousers’ ¥4,990 price is scheduled from November 10, rather than already effective. The Japanese table below retains all 15 entries, including food, housing, transport and discretionary purchases. [1]
First, get the arithmetic right
A 2% annual rise compounded over five years is about 10.4%. Nikkei explicitly acknowledges this; accusing it of comparing five-year change with one-year inflation without qualification would be wrong. The BOJ’s assessment of underlying inflation, a selected product’s cumulative price rise, and a particular household’s purchasing power measure different things. CPI averages a consumption basket and uses quality adjustments where relevant. A higher minimum iPhone or car price is a real cash hurdle, but not automatically an unchanged product’s pure inflation. [1–2]
Likewise, the rental average reported by a property portal is not every sitting tenant’s rent increase. Location, size and listing mix matter. The Cabinet Office distinguishes flow-based asking rents from stock-based CPI rents. Neither distinction makes renters’ difficulties imaginary. [3]
Seven corporate records worth remembering
Seven-Eleven Japan, 2009: the JFTC ordered it to cease conduct that forced franchisees to abandon markdown sales while franchisees bore disposal costs. The finding concerned abuse of superior bargaining position. The company initially disputed the breadth of the characterization. This is historical evidence about how losses were allocated, not proof that today’s rice-ball price is illegal. [4–5]
Fast Retailing/Uniqlo, 2015: the company acknowledged some labor problems, including excessive working hours, at two Chinese supplier factories. It published a corrective plan and later reported progress. These were supplier factories, not evidence that every Uniqlo workplace remains abusive. Consumers deserve to know whether higher prices also support fair purchasing terms and labor conditions. [6–7]
McDonald’s Japan, 2018: the company acknowledged a Consumer Affairs Agency order over advertising for two roast-beef products sold in 2017. Some beef was formed meat; its advertising failed to communicate this adequately. It defended the meat’s quality while accepting the need for clearer disclosure. This is not a finding about today’s Big Mac. [8]
Honda, 2024: certification irregularities involved past models, including an earlier N-BOX. MLIT subsequently confirmed standards compliance for the 31 affected models across four manufacturers, while directing Honda and others to implement prevention measures. Procedural misconduct and vehicle noncompliance are not interchangeable; the current N-BOX cannot be branded unsafe from this history. [9–10]
JR East, 2024: MLIT reported that records of wheelset pressing work from 2008 to March 2017 had been altered to fit prescribed values. Safety checks and subsequent supervisory instructions also belong in the record. This raises accountability questions for an essential service, not evidence that its 2026 fare increase financed misconduct. [11–12]
Apple, 2014: a US FTC settlement required at least \$32.5 million in consumer refunds and changes to consent practices over children’s unauthorized in-app purchases. This was a civil regulatory settlement, not a criminal conviction or evidence about Japanese handset pricing. [13]
Kao-group Kanebo, 2013: its published chronology records a May medical warning, a June recall decision, Kao’s July approval and the July 4 announcement concerning rhododenol products and white-patch symptoms. It also records compensation measures. The issue concerns cosmetics; it does not imply that Kao’s laundry detergent has the same defect. [14]
Yoshinoya provides a different governance example: in April 2022 the group dismissed an executive over conduct it described as unacceptable on human-rights and gender grounds, and announced training. That is a documented personnel action, not a finding of systematic food-price abuse. [15]
Pricing power is not moral authority
For Calbee, Nichirei Foods, the egg supplier, 4°C, Oriental Land and Palace Hotel Tokyo, this article does not establish specific misconduct. Nor is LIFULL, the source of a rental statistic, necessarily the landlord charging that rent. Listing a brand in a price table cannot substitute for proving a case.
The stronger critique is economic: who can pass costs onward, who must absorb them, and who can realistically walk away? A theme-park ticket or luxury hotel stay differs from housing or commuting. Companies can rationally raise prices without being entitled to public applause.
For investors, separate cost recovery, product upgrading and margin expansion; then inspect volumes, repeat purchases, supplier terms, wages and cash flow. Price increases can temporarily lift revenue while weakening the customer base. Historical misconduct warrants scrutiny of governance, not a fabricated causal explanation for current inflation.
My position: do not ask households to forget a company’s record simply because its input costs rose. Show the cost bridge, the customer value, and who receives the additional money. A higher price tag is not a certificate of better corporate conduct.
Scope: October 30, 2026. Historical findings and company responses are dated above; present continuation is not presumed. Sources are linked below.
